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How Hard and Soft Law Interact in International Regulatory Governance: 
Alternatives, Complements and Antagonists 
 
by Gregory C. Shaffer and Mark A. Pollack1 
 
There has been a considerable amount of legal scholarship regarding the use of 
“hard” and “soft” law in international governance, written from legal positivist, 
normative and political economy perspectives.  Within the legal academy, hard law 
generally refers to legal obligations of a formally binding nature and soft law to law that 
is not formally binding but may nonetheless exercise significant influence on behavior. 
Other social scientists slightly vary these definitions of international hard and soft law, 
viewing international legal instruments as lying along a hard-soft law continuum in terms 
of different features, such as the law’s precision, obligation and delegation to a third party 
for dispute resolution, each of which can be of a harder and softer nature.2  Much of this 
literature assesses the relative functional attributes and deficiencies of hard and soft law 
instruments as alternatives for international governance, as well as how these instruments 
can be combined sequentially as mutually reinforcing complements to lead to greater 
international cooperation over time.  The literature on hard and soft law, in turn, has 
influenced our understanding of transatlantic economic cooperation, in which the United 
States (US) and the European Union (EU) have undertaken a wide range of agreements, 
both bilateral and multilateral, and largely of a soft-law variety. 
                                                 
1 Gregory Shaffer is Melvin C. Steen Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School, and Mark 
Pollack is Associate Professor of Political Science, Temple University.  We thank John Bronsteen, Manfred 
Elsig, Brett Frischmann, Tom Ginsburg, Daniel Halberstam, Terence Halliday, Kal Raustiala, Joel 
Trachtman and Spencer Waller for their comments, as well as the participants at a conference at the 
University of Michigan entitled “Systemic Implications of Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation and 
Competition” on May 8, 2008; at a panel on Transnational Legal Orders at the Law and Society 
Association conference on May 30, 2008; and at a workshop at Loyola University Chicago School of Law 
on May 7, 2008.  We thank Melissa Beckman, Mathew Bills, Mathew Fortin and Kisa Patel for their 
research assistance. All errors of course remain our own. 
2 See Abbott and Snidal 2000 and discussion in Part IA. 




The existing scholarly literature on hard and soft law can be divided into three 
camps: legal positivists, rationalists and constructivists.3 All three of these camps 
predominantly view hard and soft law as interacting in complementary ways, but they 
have different starting points. Many legal positivists question if soft law can be 
considered to be law at all because it is not legally binding, but, in any case, they view it 
at best as an inferior instrument whose only rationale is to serve as a stepping stone to 
hard (real) law.  Rationalists, in contrast, contend that states choose between hard and 
soft law instruments depending on the level of commitment that they wish to make.  
Since rationalists find that both hard and soft law can be advantageous to states in 
different circumstances, neither should be judged to be superior.  For example, 
rationalists contend that because soft law is less costly for states to negotiate and less 
costly to their sovereignty, states will prefer it in situations of uncertainty where they 
need to learn more about the intentions of the other parties or about the underlying 
technical issues.  Constructivists, in contrast to rationalists, maintain that state interests 
are formed through socialization processes of interstate interaction which soft law can 
facilitate.  They thus favor soft law instruments for their capacity to generate shared 
norms and a sense of common purpose and identity.  Many constructivists also focus on 
the role of non-state actors who only have soft law instruments available and who use 
these instruments to catalyze change in international law and national regulatory practice.  
As with legal positivists, both rationalists and constructivist scholars contend that soft 
law can lead to hard law and, once formed, can help to further elaborate hard law, 
resulting in progressive cycles of law-making leading to greater regulatory cooperation.  
For purposes of this chapter, we will remain agnostic as to which of these three 
camps most accurately captures the nature of hard and soft law and their relative 
advantages, although we have our own views in this respect.4  We will remain agnostic 
because our primary purpose in this chapter is to reveal what is missing in the analysis of 
all three camps because of their focus on hard-soft law interaction only in complementary 
terms.  We make two central claims.  Our first and primary claim is that international 
                                                 
3  A full explication of these three modes of scholarship and their approaches to hard and soft law 
interaction is set forth in Part I.C. 
4 Neither of us are legal formalists, and both of us can be viewed primarily as rationalists because of our 
focus on actors and their interests, although our approach is of a soft rationalist variant which takes 




hard and soft law instruments (or, for that matter, any legal instruments that vary in their 
soft and hard law characteristics) can serve not only as alternatives or as complements but 
indeed as antagonists, working at cross-purposes with each other.  Hard and soft law may 
interact as complements, we argue, but only under certain conditions, including most 
notably the absence of significant distributive conflict among parties to such agreements.  
Under other conditions, however, which we identify as the existence of distributive 
conflicts and of pluralistic regime complexes, hard and soft law may interact in an 
antagonistic fashion.  In this sense, the existing literature may be accused of selection 
bias, focusing on those issue-areas in which distributive conflict is low and where the 
interaction of hard and soft law is correspondingly largely complementary.   
Our second claim is that this antagonistic interaction between hard and soft law 
has particular implications in a fragmented international system, affecting the very nature 
of international hard and soft law regimes and their purported advantages.  We will show 
how the interaction of hard and soft law regimes can lead to the “hardening” of soft law 
regimes, resulting in more strategic bargaining and reducing their purported advantages 
of consensus-building through information-sharing and persuasion, and the “softening” of 
hard law regimes, resulting in reduced legal certainty and predictability.  
The chapter is in five parts. Part I provides an overview of the existing literature 
regarding the definitions of hard and soft law (section A), the relative attributes and 
deficiencies of hard and soft law as alternatives (section B), and how hard and soft law 
can act as complements, leading to greater cooperation (section C).  Part II provides the 
background theoretical context for assessing the roles and interaction of hard and soft law 
in international regulatory governance as alternatives, complements and antagonists, 
namely the role of US and EU economic and institutional power (section A), the role of 
distributive conflict between the US, EU and third countries (section B), and the 
challenges posed by international regime fragmentation (section C).  Part III assess how, 
in the presence of distributive conflicts and fragmented regime complexes, hard and soft 
law can just as likely act as opposing tools aimed to counter each other’s influence, 
focusing on the US/EU dispute over genetically modified foods as an illustrative case 




Part IV then sets forth three hypotheses regarding how hard and soft law 
instruments interact in international governance, and, in particular, the conditions under 
which they work in a complementary or opposing manner. Our first two hypotheses 
concern the impact of US and EU cooperation and rivalry on how international hard and 
soft law regimes interact.  We contend that where the US and EU agree on a regulatory 
approach, in particular because distributive conflict between them is weak or absent, we 
are more likely to see hard and soft law work as complements in an evolutionary manner, 
consistent with the existing literature (section A).  In contrast, where the US and EU 
disagree on a regulatory approach, we are more likely to see hard and soft law work in 
opposition to each other, especially where there are distributional consequences which 
spur the US and EU to attempt to advance their perspectives in different international 
regimes (section B).  Given the fragmented nature of the international system, the US and 
EU will attempt to advance their interests in those regimes that they find to be most 
favorable to their positions.  In such settings, we argue, soft law regimes may be 
“hardened” through their links to other regimes, losing the purported soft law advantages 
of flexibility and informality, while hard law regimes such as the World Trade 
Organization’s dispute settlement process may be “softened.”  The United States and the 
European Union are not the only actors, however, capable of strategically manipulating 
hard and soft law regimes.  Hence, even where the US and EU agree on a regulatory 
approach, smaller states can also use hard and soft law strategies to attempt to thwart US 
and EU aims, again choosing regimes more favorable to their positions in a fragmented 
international system (section C).  However, the US and EU have significant advantages 
because of their market power and resources, and they can attempt to play smaller 
countries off of each other, including through bilateral negotiations.  
We conclude that scholars and policymakers need to recognize more explicitly 
that there are often real distributive conflicts in international regulatory relations, 
resulting in conflicts between hard and soft law instruments and regimes.  We find that 
this development is not necessarily to be lamented, but rather reflects a maturation of 
international law, which is responding to global developments in a world of diverse 
regulatory competences in which regulation in countries and in diverse international 




regarding how international hard and soft law instruments and regimes interact in 
different contexts.   
 
I.  The Canonical Literature on International Hard and Soft Law: Their Attributes 
as Alternatives and their Interaction as Complements  
 
We begin with an overview of scholarship concerning the definitions of hard and 
soft law, and this scholarship’s assessment of the various attributes and deficiencies of 
hard and soft law as alternatives.  We create a typology of this literature into three camps, 
each of which predominantly views hard and soft law to act as complements, leading to 
greater international cooperation.  We here provide the background for our argument that 
the existing literature exhibits a selection bias as regards how hard and soft law interact.  
In Parts II and III, we will show how, in a world of  distributional conflict within a 
decentralized governance system, hard and soft law instruments (or, for that matter, any 
international legal instruments) can frequently work in opposition to each other as 
antagonists, affecting the operation of international regimes in the process.   
 
A. Definitions of Hard and Soft Law 
To assess how hard and soft law interact in international governance, we must 
first define these terms.  Here there is much disagreement in the existing literature.  Many 
legal scholars use a simple binary binding/non-binding divide to distinguish hard from 
soft law.5  Positivist legal scholars tend to deny the very concept of “soft law,” since law 
by definition is “binding.”6  Rational institutionalist scholars respond that “the term 
‘binding agreement’ is a misleading hyperbole” when it comes to international affairs, 
but they still find that the language of “binding commitments” matters in terms of 
                                                 
5 See the leading study by Shelton et al (2000) which settles for this distinction, at 4. See also Reininke and 
Witte 2000: 76 (“soft law as used herein means normative agreements that are not legally binding”); 
Snyder 1993: 198 (“soft law consists of “rules of conduct which, in principle, have no legally binding force 
but which nevertheless may have practical effects”); and Klabbers 1996: 168 (advocating retention of the 
“traditional binary conception of law”).   
6 Klabbers takes a positivist approach, arguing that “law can’t be more or less binding” so that the soft law 
concept is logically flawed.  Klabbers 1996: 181.  Prosper Weil takes a normative approach, arguing that 
the increasing use of soft law represents a shift pursuant to which international law norms vary in their 
relative normativity, and he finds that this trend “might destabilize the whole international normative 




signaling by states of the seriousness of their commitments, such that non-compliance 
will entail greater reputational costs.7  Constructivist scholars, in contrast, focus less on 
the binding nature of law at the enactment stage, and more on the effectiveness of law at 
the implementation stage, addressing the gap between the law-in-the-books and the law-
in-action.  They note how even domestic law varies in terms of its impact on behavior, so 
that binary distinctions between binding “hard law” and non-binding “soft law” are 
illusory.8  They find that the very concept of “binding” international law is highly suspect 
as an operational concept. At the international level where centralized institutions are 
typically missing, most observers realize that “most international law is ‘soft’ in 
distinctive ways.”9 
Working within this rationalist perspective, Kenneth Abbott and his coauthors 
have defined legalization in international relations as consisting of a spectrum of three 
factors (i) precision of rules; (ii) obligation; and (iii) delegation to a third-party decision-
maker.10  International regimes vary in the extent of their legalization along these 
dimensions, which can give them a “harder” or “softer” legal character.  In this respect, 
hard law “refers to legally binding obligations that are precise (or can be made precise 
through adjudication or the issuance of detailed regulations) and that delegate authority 
for interpreting and implementing the law.”11  International trade law, at least formally, 
comes closest to this ideal type, although as we will see, it too is soft (or can become soft) 
in certain areas.12    
 By contrast with this ideal-type of hard law, soft law can be defined as a residual 
category:  “The realm of ‘soft law’ begins once legal arrangements are weakened along 
                                                 
7 Lipson 1991: 508. See also Raustiala 2005; and Guzman 2008 and Guzman 2005.  Guzman states that “an 
agreement is soft if it is not a formal treaty.” Guzman 2005: 591.  He finds that states rationally choose soft 
law because they wish to reduce the cost to their reputation of potentially violating it in light of uncertainty. 
8 Some scholars accuse legal formalists of “elite ignorance” and “non-knowledge of the social.” See, for 
example, Goodrich 2000: 150.   
9 Abbott and Snidal 2000: 421. 
10 Abbott at al. 2000.  Abbott and Snidal work within a “rational design” approach to international 
institutions, in Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001.  See also Guzman 2008. 
11 Abbott and Snidal 2000: 37. 
12 See our discussion in Part III below. In addition, from a formal perspective, international trade law does 
not have independent enforcement power.  Rather WTO panels authorize a winning party to withdraw 
equivalent concessions, in an amount determined by the panel, in the event of non-compliance by the losing 




one or more of the dimensions of obligation, precision and delegation.”13  Thus, if an 
agreement is not formally binding, it is soft along one dimension. Similarly, if an 
agreement is formally binding but its content is vague so that the agreement leaves almost 
complete discretion to the parties as to its implementation, then the agreement is soft 
along this second dimension.  Finally, if an agreement does not delegate any authority to 
a third party to monitor its implementation or to interpret and enforce it, then the 
agreement again can be soft because the parties can discursively justify their acts in 
legalistic terms with less consequence, whether in terms of reputational costs or other 
sanctions.   
Some scholars with sociological, constructivist leanings have questioned the 
characterization of law in terms of these three attributes (precision, obligation and 
delegation) because it distracts from how law operates normatively.14  They likely do so 
because of their opposition to a presumption among legal positivists and rational 
institutionalists that “hardness” means binding rules interpreted and enforced by courts.  
In other words, their counterparts in interdisciplinary debates in international relations — 
realist and rationalist institutionalist scholars — tend to discount the efficacy of soft law 
because it creates no binding obligation on states who can thus ignore it at their whim in 
light of their interests.  For example, Richard Steinberg contends, from a realist 
perspective, that “most public international lawyers, realists and positivists, consider soft 
law to be inconsequential.”15  Similarly, Andrew Guzman maintains, from a rational 
institutionalist perspective, that “soft law represents a choice by the parties to enter into a 
weaker form of commitment.”16  Guzman and Steinberg focus on states’ pursuit of pre-
determined interests.  They do not address how states may change those interests through 
                                                 
13 Abbott and Snidal 2000: 38.  
14 See e.g., Finnemore and Toope 2001 (taking a more sociological perspective, and critiquing Abbott et 
al’s formal definition of legalization because it obscures how law and legal norms actually operate in 
practice). We also recognize that these formal definitions can obscure the relative roles of “hard” and “soft” 
law in sociological terms—that is, from the way law and norms operate in the world, which indeed is what 
interests us. Binding dispute settlement can be ignored or simply reflect existing power asymmetries, so 
that “hard” law may in fact not be so “hard” in practice. Similarly, softer forms of law can be much more 
transformative of state and constituent conduct, which should be the real measure of law’s impact in the 
world. Despite these caveats, we believe that that hard/soft distinction does capture something important 
about the making and implementation of international law, and we find the distinction to be particularly 
useful for our analyses of how hard and soft law regimes and instruments interact. 
15 Steinberg 2002: 340 




transnational processes of interaction, deliberation and persuasion coordinated through 
international institutions. 
Constructivists, in contrast, explicitly address how international regimes can lead 
states to change their perceptions of state interests.17  International law scholars 
frequently take such an approach.  For example, Abraham and Antonia Chayes contend, 
“what is left out of the institutionalist account is the active role of the regime in 
modifying preferences, generating new options, persuading the parties to move toward 
increasing compliance with regime norms, and guiding the evolution of the normative 
structure in the direction of the overall objectives of the regime.”18  Similarly Harold Koh 
stresses the “internalization” processes to which international law gives rise through 
iterative processes involving interpretation over time,19 and Thomas Franck stresses the 
compliance pull of international law that is deemed legitimate in its procedures.20  From 
the constructivist perspective, soft law mechanisms can be as or more effective than hard 
law by creating settings in which states engage in open-ended discussions to reach better 
and more effective policy because they are less wary of rigid hard law consequences.  
In sum, the typology used by Abbott and Snidal does not prejudge these 
instruments’ relative value.  Rather, the typology simply characterizes different 
instruments which actors may choose in terms of their precision, binding legal obligation 
and delegation along a continuum.  We find this typology and continuum to be 
particularly useful for our analyses of how hard and soft law instruments and regimes 
interact, and thus we adopt the definition of Abbott and Snidal for our purposes.   
 
B. Advantages and Disadvantages of Hard and Soft Law as Alternatives   
States and private actors have increasingly used a wide range of instruments 
having a relatively harder or softer legal nature in terms of precision, obligation and 
delegation to advance their aims.  These instruments offer different advantages and 
                                                 
17 Ruggie 1998. 
18 Chayes and Chayes 1993: 229; see also Franck 1990 (on the “compliance pull” of law); and Koh 1998 
(on “internalization” processes). 
19 The transnational legal process theory of Harold Koh addresses how states internalize legal norms 
through repeated “interaction,” including through the work of non-state actors, resulting in new 
“interpretation,” which is “internalized” within states at the domestic level. Koh 1998.  




disadvantages in different contexts, involving factors at the domestic and international 
levels.  They are sometimes used alone and sometimes combined dynamically over time, 
resulting in a complex hybrid of hard and soft law instruments.  In this section, we 
address the use of hard and soft law instruments as alternatives in light of their respective 
attributes and deficiencies before turning to an assessment of how they interact.  
The quantitative growth in the use of international hard and soft law instruments 
reflects the breadth and intensification of economic globalization, by which we mean “a 
process of widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide connectedness, in 
particular in the economic sphere.”21  The very emergence of the soft law concept reflects 
the multiplication of producers of international law in this context, including not only 
foreign ministries, but also sector-specific transgovernmental networks, supranational 
bureaucracies, multinational corporations and business associations, and international 
non-governmental organizations.22  These groups generally do not have the authority to 
create binding international law in a traditional sense, which is reserved to states, yet they 
use non-binding instruments to advance their policy goals, instruments which may be 
subsequently transformed into binding hard law, at either the national or international 
levels.23   
Private actors can also work with and through states to create binding hard law.  As 
John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos find in their masterful study of thirteen areas of global 
business regulation, business actors play frequently leading roles.  First, Braithwaite and 
Drahos find that “state regulation follows industry self-regulatory practice more than the 
reverse.”24  Janet Levit’s recent work on the law of documentary letters of credit provides 
an excellent example.25  Second, corporate actors enroll states to advance their aims.  In 
this respect, Braithwaite and Drahos find that “US corporations exert more power in the 
world system than corporations of other states because they can enroll the support of the 
most powerful state in the world.”26  
                                                 
21 We adapt this definition from Held et al, 1999: 2.  
22 Robilant 2005: 500.   
23 Functional state agencies, however, will play the leading roles in areas within their competence, which 
can result in hard law.  Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: 479-485. 
24 Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: 481. 
25 Levit 2008. 




As an institutional form, hard law features many advantages. In particular, 
rationalist scholars find that: 
 
• Hard law instruments allow states to commit themselves more credibly 
to international agreements.  Hard law instruments make state 
commitments more credible because they increase the cost of reneging, 
whether on account of legal sanctions or on account of the costs to a 
state’s reputation where it is found to have acted in violation of its legal 
commitments.27   
• Hard law treaties are more credible because they can have direct legal 
effects in national jurisdictions (being “self-executing”), or they can 
require domestic legal enactment.  Where treaty obligations are 
implemented through domestic legislation, they create new tools that 
mobilize domestic actors, increasing the audience costs of a violation 
and thus making their commitments more credible.28   
• Hard law instruments solve problems of incomplete contracting by 
creating mechanisms for the interpretation and elaboration of legal 
commitments over time.29 
• Hard law instruments better permit states to monitor and enforce their 
commitments, including through the use of dispute settlement bodies 
such as courts.30   
 
States, as well as private actors working with and through state representatives, thus tend 
to use hard law where the benefits of cooperation are great and the potential for 
opportunism and its costs are high.31  To control for the risks of opportunism, they can 
create third party monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, as under the WTO 
                                                 
27 States are arguably particularly concerned with their reputation for compliance. Andrew Guzman 
contends that states’ calculus over the reputational costs of non-compliance is the primary factor for 
explaining state compliance with international law. Guzman 2005.  See also Abbott and Snidal 2000; and 
Lipson 1991: 508. 
28 Abbott and Snidal 2000. 
29 Abbott and Snidal 2000.  
30 Abbott and Snidal 2000: 38. 




committee, trade policy review and dispute settlement systems.  These monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms reduce the transaction costs of subsequent interstate interaction 
through providing an ongoing forum for interpreting, applying, enforcing and elaborating 
agreed rules.32   
Yet hard law also entails significant costs.  It can create formal commitments that 
restrict the behavior of states, thus infringing on national sovereignty in potentially 
sensitive areas.  As a result, it can encourage states to bargain fiercely and at length 
regarding the legally binding commitments into which they are entering which will 
continue to apply over time.  Because states are more likely to drag out negotiations over 
legally binding commitments, the use of hard law can increase contracting costs.  In 
addition, hard law agreements can be more difficult to amend to adapt to changing 
circumstances.  Therefore writing detailed binding agreements may be wasteful because 
it can force states to plan for contingent events that may not occur, and can lead to 
undesired rigidity or prevent agreement altogether.33 Soft law, in contrast, can be adapted, 
amended and replaced more easily because its provisions are non-binding and thus no 
single state or group of states can block its amendment. 
Defenders of soft law argue that soft law instruments offer significant offsetting 
advantages over hard law.  They find, in particular, that: 
 
• Soft law instruments are easier and less costly to negotiate.  
• Soft law instruments impose lower “sovereignty costs” on states in sensitive 
areas. 
• Soft law instruments provide greater flexibility for states to cope with 
uncertainty and learn over time.  
• Soft law instruments allow states to be more ambitious and engage in 
“deeper” cooperation than they would if they had to worry about enforcement. 
• Soft law instruments cope better with diversity. 
                                                 
32 Abbott and Snidal 2000: 430. 
33 Abbott and Snidal 2000: 433. Trubek, Cottrell and Nance 2006.  These arguments also support the use of 





• Soft law instruments are available to non-state actors, including international 
secretariats, sub-state public actors such as administrative agencies and 
business associations and non-governmental organizations.34   
 
Abbott and Snidal, for example, contend that states use soft law where contracting costs 
increase, whether because of the number of parties involved, factual uncertainty, 
domestic ratification challenges, politically charged issue areas or distributional 
asymmetries.  They note how, in these contexts, “states can limit their legal obligation 
through hortatory language, exceptions, reservations and the like,” such as safeguard and 
rebalancing clauses under the WTO.35 
Both rationalist and constructivist scholars recognize the potential advantages of 
soft law instruments, but they do so in different ways.  While rationalist-oriented scholars 
focus on the reduction of contracting and sovereignty costs under soft law, constructivist 
scholars stress how soft law can “facilitate constitutive processes such as persuasion, 
learning, argumentation, and socialization.”36  While rationalist scholars note the 
importance of soft law instruments for generating information leading to common 
understandings in situations of uncertainty, constructivist scholars contend that soft law 
instruments can help states to develop common norms and a sense of a collective 
enterprise.  For both rationalists and constructivists, then, soft law can create mechanisms 
for parties to learn about consequences before obligations are made binding.  This 
process occurred under the Montreal Protocol for Protection of the Ozone, an agreement 
to protect a global commons, the earth’s atmosphere.  Soft law instruments can bring a 
broad array of participants together, as under a framework convention, in a process that 
over time permits them to gain trust, leading to harder obligations in the future.37  
Soft law instruments, nonetheless, have obvious disadvantages.  First, from a 
normative perspective, if soft law instruments are effective, they can be criticized for 
their relative obscurity, since they can remove law-making from democratic oversight, 
                                                 
34 For good discussions on the purported strengths of soft law, see e.g. Lipson 1991: 500-501, 514-527 
(discussing the strengths of “informal agreements”); Raustiala and Victor 1998: 684-686; Hillgenburg 
1999: 501, 504; Abbott and Snidal 2000: 38-39; Trubek, Cotrell and Nance 2006; Trebilcock and Kirtin 
2004; and Sindico 2006: 832.  
35 Abbott and Snidal 2004: 54. 
36 Trubek, Cottrell and Nance 2006: 75.   




such that provisions with distributive implications are not fully discussed within 
legislative or other government bodies.38  Second, from the perspective of effectiveness, 
soft law instruments create little or no legal obligation and provide no binding third-party 
dispute settlement to resolve disputes among the parties and fill in the details of 
incomplete contracts.  Soft law instruments, depending on their level of precision, may 
also make it difficult to determine whether a state is acting in accordance with its 
commitments and thus create greater opportunities to evade responsibility.39  For 
example, the OECD created a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) of financial experts 
which issued guidelines which limit sovereignty costs because of their soft law nature.  
Some commentators, however, have found that the task force guidelines have been 
largely ineffective in leading to policy change.40  Similarly, at the 1992 Rio Summit, the 
parties only agreed to a non-binding set of principles and an Agenda 21 to create a 
“comprehensive plan of action,” contrary to the demands of environmental non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) for a hard law treaty.  Skeptics question the 
effectiveness of these soft law instruments.  They contend that much of international law, 
when it lacks teeth, can be simply symbolic, constituting a form of junk law.41   
It would nonetheless be a mistake, in our view, to view hard law instruments as 
always preferable to soft law instruments from the standpoint of effectiveness, even 
though states may sometimes use soft law instruments only to paper over differences.  As 
Kal Raustiala points out, we must distinguish between the concepts of compliance (as 
with hard law obligations) and effectiveness.42  He writes, “compliance as a concept 
draws no causal linkage between a rule and behavior, but simply identifies a conformity 
between the rule and behavior.  To speak of effectiveness is to speak directly of causality: 
to claim that a rule is ‘effective’ is to claim that it led to certain behavior or outcomes, 
which may or may not meet the legal standard of compliance.”43  In terms of the law-in-
action, we are less concerned with formal compliance, which may mean little if the 
                                                 
38 See Klabbers 1998, Levit 2008.  
39 Abbott and Snidal 2000: 446.   
40 Simmons 2000: 244-263. Cf. Machado 2008. 
41 Cf Edelman 1964 Goldsmith and Posner 2005; Raustiala 2005; Susskind and Ozawa 1992. 
42  Raustiala 2000: 398; Raustiala and Slaughter 2002.  On the “depth” of cooperation, i.e. cooperative 
agreements that require a greater change in state behavior relative to the status quo, see Downs, Rocke and 
Barsoom 1996.   




obligations reflect no policy change, than with effectiveness, in terms of attaining policy 
goals.  Advocates of soft law as an alternative contend that soft law can be more effective 
in practice than many formally binding treaties.  
In sum, hard and soft law instruments offer different advantages for different 
contexts involving a range of factors that actors consider.  For these reasons, a growing 
number of scholars in law and political science have advocated a pragmatic approach, 
selecting alternative hard and soft law approaches depending on the characteristics of the 
issue and the negotiating and institutional context in question.  Scholars have noted, in 
particular, how hard and soft law instruments may be effectively combined to lead to 
greater cooperation.  Yet as Abbott and Snidal write, while “soft law sometimes [is] 
designed as a way station to harder legalization, … often it is preferable on its own 
terms” as an alternative.44 
 
C. Hard and Soft Law Interaction as Complements   
Although the respective costs and benefits of hard and soft law remain a subject 
of contention, legal and political science scholars have moved increasingly towards a 
view that hard and soft international law can build upon each other as complementary 
tools for international problem-solving.  These scholars contend that hard and soft law 
mechanisms can build upon each other in two predominant ways:  (1) non-binding soft 
law can lead the way to binding hard law, and (2) binding hard law can subsequently be 
elaborated through soft law instruments. For example, a leading US international law 
casebook introduces the concept of soft law in terms of how “soft law instruments are 
consciously used to generate support for the promulgation of treaties or to help generate 
customary international law norms [i.e. binding hard law],” and how “treaties and state 
practice give rise to soft law that supplements and advances treaty and customary 
norms.”45  Scholars thus take a pragmatic policy-oriented approach to show how hard and 
soft law instruments provide not only alternative tools for cooperation, but also serve as 
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complements of each other in dynamic processes of legalization, leading to greater 
international [regulatory] cooperation and coordination over time.46   
These scholars’ views regarding hard and soft law complements can be divided 
into three camps: (1) positivist legal scholars who find that soft law is inferior to hard law 
but should not be discarded because it can potentially lead to hard law; (2) rationalist 
scholars with a political economy orientation who view soft law as a complement to hard 
law which serves state interests in many contexts, including because the hard law option 
is not available; and (3) constructivist scholars who view soft law as a complement to 
hard law which may be desirable in itself by facilitating dialogic and experimentalist 
transnational and domestic processes which transform norms, understandings and 
perceptions of state interests.  
Positivist legal scholars find that soft law is inferior to hard law because it does 
not correspond to the ideal type of law.47  That is, soft law lacks formally binding 
obligations which are interpreted and enforced by courts, and it thus fails to generate 
jurisprudence over time.  For this reason, these scholars view soft law as a second-best 
alternative to hard law, either as a way-station on the way to hard law, or as a fall-back 
when hard law approaches fail.48  Kirton and Trebilcock, for example, in a study of the 
use of soft and hard law in global trade, environment and social governance, find “strong 
support for the familiar feeling that soft law is a second-best substitute for a first-best 
hard law, being created when and because the relevant hard law does not exist and the 
intergovernmental negotiations to produce it have failed.”49  Sindico likewise writes, 
“[s]oft law, and voluntary standards in particular, are a stage in the creation of 
international legal norms.  It is as a pioneer of hard law that soft law finds its raison 
d’être in the normative challenge for sustainable global governance.”50  The implication 
is that soft law otherwise has no raison d’être.  Sindico, for example, views the corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) movement in terms of “the beginning of a step towards 
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comprehensive hard law in this field,”51 as opposed to a flexible, adaptive process which 
is valuable in itself.   
These scholars often view soft law solely in terms of its relationship to a hard law 
ideal.  In her valuable introduction to a special volume on soft law organized by the 
American Society of International Law (ASIL), for example, Dinah Shelton categorizes 
soft law in the following five ways, each of which is linked to positivist conceptions of 
hard law:  
 
“(i) Elaborative soft law, that is principles that provide guidance to the 
interpretation, elaboration, or application of hard law [i.e. soft law which builds 
from hard law]… 
(ii) Emergent hard law, that is principles that are first formulated in non-binding 
form with the possibility, or even aspiration, of negotiating a subsequent treaty, or 
harden into binding custom through the development of state practice and opinio 
juris [i.e. soft law which builds to hard law]… 
(iii) Soft law as evidence of the existence of hard obligations [i.e. soft law which 
builds to hard customary international law].  
(iv) Parallel soft and hard law, that is similar provisions articulated in both hard 
and soft forms allowing the soft version to act as a fall-back provision. 
(v) Soft law as a source of legal obligation, through acquiescence and estoppel, 
perhaps against the original intentions of the parties.”52   
 
Reinicke and Witte likewise stress, in their cross-cutting overview in the same volume, 
how soft law agreements “can and often do represent the first important element in an 
evolutionary process that shapes legal relationships among and between multiple actors, 
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facilitating and ultimately enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of transnational 
policy-making.”53   Similarly, John Kirton and Michael Trebilcock conclude that “at best, 
it [soft law], is a complement.”54  
Abbott and Snidal, in contrast, taking a rational institutionalist political economy 
approach, are agnostic as to whether hard or soft law is preferable because they focus on 
varying state interests in different contexts.  Sometimes states prefer hard law and 
sometimes soft law to advance their joint policy aims.  In their work on the “pathways to 
cooperation,” Abbott and Snidal nonetheless define three pathways of which two 
explicitly involve the progressive hardening of law.  The three pathways are: the use of a 
framework convention which subsequently deepens in the precision of its coverage; the 
use of a plurilateral agreement which subsequently broadens in its membership; and the 
use of a soft law instrument which subsequently leads to binding legal commitments.  
They note how these three pathways can be “blended” and “sequenced,” once more 
resulting in a mutually reinforcing, evolutionary interaction between hard and soft law 
mechanisms.55 
Finally, constructivist-oriented scholars likewise focus on how hard and soft law 
are used as complements.  For example, Braithwaite and Drahos point both to the 
importance of using framework conventions and soft law as a first step which “can, over 
time be more detailed through rule-making.”56   They contend that neither hard nor soft 
law provisions should necessarily be privileged because states and non-state actors need 
flexibility to address situations that involve uncertainty and require experimentation. 
Trubek and his co-authors, for example, contend that soft law instruments can help to 
generate knowledge (as through the use of benchmarking, peer review, and exchange of 
good practices), develop shared ideas, build trust, and, if desirable, establish “non-
binding standards that can eventually harden into binding rules once uncertainties are 
reduced and a higher degree of consensus ensues.”57  Janet Levit, working in a legal 
pluralist framework, finds that international soft law instruments generate normativity 
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that affects both subsequent hard law enactments and judicial decisions.58  Some scholars 
working in an experimentalist “new governance” tradition go further, arguing that soft 
law approaches should generally be privileged to promote responsive governance.59   
 
II. Theorizing International Hard and Soft Law Interaction: 
Power, Distributive Conflict and Regime Complexes 
 
 The existing literature on hard and soft law typically takes as its starting 
assumption the possibility of joint gains from cooperation among states, and proceeds to 
explore the advantages and disadvantages, the choice, and the effectiveness of hard and 
soft law approaches to international cooperation.  We agree that the prospect of joint 
gains is an important prerequisite for international cooperation, and we have seen in Part 
I that such prospects continue to exist for international policy cooperation.   
Nevertheless, we cannot fully understand our central question – the interaction of 
hard and soft law – without considering the ways in which power, distributional conflict, 
and regime complexes affect how hard and soft law regimes interact, and whether they 
will do so productively.  Indeed, we argue below that the harmonious, complementary, 
mutually reinforcing interaction of hard and soft law relies on a hitherto unspecified set 
of scope conditions, including most importantly in particular a low level of distributional 
conflict among the players.  These conditions may hold in certain areas, we maintain, but 
there are good theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that variation in distributive 
conflict will spur hard and soft law regimes to interact in different ways, sometimes as 
alternatives, sometimes as complements and sometimes as antagonists.  
In this section, therefore, we lay out our theoretical argument about the reasons 
why, and the conditions under which, we expect hard and soft law to interact as 
antagonists.  The analysis is in three parts. First, reflecting the transatlantic theme of this 
volume, we examine the sources of United States and European Union power in 
international regulatory affairs, arguing that both market size and institutional 
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characteristics have made the US and the EU the leading, and roughly equal, powers in 
global as well as bilateral regulatory cooperation (section A).  Next, we argue that 
international regulatory cooperation, and indeed international cooperation more broadly, 
is frequently characterized by intense distributional conflict, in which actors like the US 
and the EU may have sharply differing preferences over regulatory outcomes, with each 
side attempting to export its own regulatory model and force the costs of adjustment onto 
others (section B).  Finally, we examine the problems of “regime complexes” and legal 
fragmentation in international regulation, arguing that states with divergent preferences 
will have strong incentives to engage in forum shopping and “strategic inconsistency,” 
using competing legal fora to press their substantive preferences (section C).  Parts III 
and IV will then build on this analysis, making the argument that under conditions of 
distributive conflict and regime complexes, hard and soft law can interact not as 
alternatives or complements, but as mutually undermining antagonists. 
 
A. The EU, the US, and Power in International Regulatory Governance 
The United States and European Union collectively represent over 50 percent of 
global production, and over 40 percent in terms of purchasing power parity.60  In 2006, 
EU gross domestic product was slightly larger than the United States’, but not by a 
significant extent.  Because of the size of their markets, where the US and EU agree on a 
common regulatory policy, they are well-positioned to promote it globally.  For example, 
as Germain contends in the area of financial regulation, the size of the international 
markets handled in New York, London and a few other major cities “empower their 
respective state authorities” to be leaders in global regulation.61  Where they disagree, 
there is often deadlock, reflecting the equal size of their economies and markets.  With 
the rise of the economies of China, India, Brazil and other developing countries, the US 
and EU have a long-term interest in exercising global regulatory leadership now in order 
to lock their preferences into international law and institutions, but conflicts between 
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them may inhibit their ability to do so. 
The US and EU have launched a series of initiatives to promote transatlantic 
collaboration in global governance which we have assessed in our earlier work.  The 
creation of the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and the Transatlantic Economic 
Partnership (TEP) during the 1990s were premised on the idea of joint gains from 
transatlantic economic integration and in particular from joint regulatory cooperation 
across a wide range of issue-areas.62  Alongside the traditional processes of trade 
negotiation and trade dispute resolution, the transatlantic partners forged new 
mechanisms for cooperation among economic regulators in areas ranging from 
competition policy to data privacy, the environment, and food safety.63  Among the goals 
of the NTA was to promote US and EU joint leadership in global economic governance.  
These goals have been reasserted during the second term of the George W. Bush 
administration, in particular with the creation, in 2007, of a Transatlantic Economic 
Council designed to lend high-level impetus to new and continuing efforts at transatlantic 
economic cooperation in various issue-areas.64   
Although market size generally explains the growing role of the EU as a global 
actor in economic and regulatory fields, US and EU bargaining power can also be 
affected by each side’s institutional characteristics.  Where policy-making is reserved to a 
sub-federal level in the United States or a sub-EU level in the European Union, then the 
US or EU respectively will be in a weaker bargaining situation at the international level.  
The United States over time has more frequently been a global leader in regulatory 
domains because it has had greater institutional power at the federal level, combined with 
its great market power.  However, in many regulatory areas, the US has fragmented 
authority over regulatory standard-setting, leaving it to US states within the federal 
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context or to private associations.  As Walter Mattli and Tim Büthe write, “When 
standardization becomes an increasingly international process, the organizational 
characteristics of the European standardization system make for a more felicitous match 
between the national and international institutions than the characteristics of the largely 
anarchic American system.”65  They conclude, “[t]he process of aggregating technical 
preferences and projecting consensus standards to a higher level is considerably more 
difficult in the decentralized and uncoordinated standards system of the U.S., where the 
nominal national representative for international standardization is a weak and contested 
institution.” 66 
As greater policy-making powers have been delegated within Europe to EU 
institutions over time, the EU has increased its negotiating clout internationally.  Because 
of the size of the EU’s internal market, once the EU member states harmonize regulatory 
policies at the EU level and develop corresponding EU-level regulatory institutions, the 
EU is well-positioned to exercise economic clout as a global actor.  To give an example, 
Elliot Posner addresses how the establishment of the EU’s regulatory competence and its 
extraterritorial reach are key explanations for the EU’s increased authority over financial 
services regulation.67  Institutional developments in the EU have affected powerful US 
firms who, in turn, motivated the US Securities and Exchange Commission to work with 
EU authorities to accommodate and recognize EU standards in a number of areas. This 
development occurred following an extended period of benign (or malign) US neglect of 
European approaches to financial services regulation.  As the EU assumes greater 
institutional power in Europe, it should also be able to exercise greater authority in 
international governance.  In other words, the EU enhances its international authority 
both by widening (enhancing its market power through increasing EU membership) and 
by deepening (enhancing its institutional power through expanding the scope of EU 
authority to more policy areas).   
Finally, the US and EU exercise considerable authority globally because of the 
regulatory expertise they have developed domestically.  In their study of thirteen areas of 
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global business regulation, John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos conclude that “the fact that 
US and EU law are modeled more than others is not only because of their economic 
hegemony and the fact that weaker economies want to meet their terms for admission to 
the clubs they dominate.  In the case of the US in particular, modeling is underwritten by 
the sheer depth of regulatory expertise Washington agencies can offer.”68  They find that 
the US played a leading role in twelve of the thirteen areas they studied (all but for 
international labour regulation) and the EU played a leading role in nine of these areas.69  
Overall, they find that “the US is the biggest demander of new regulatory agreements as 
well as the strongest resister of regimes other states want.”70  However, “the EC 
[European Community] is more important because of the way it dominates the US in 
agenda-setting in a few arenas — prescription drugs, food, automobile safety — and is 
nearly an equal partner to the US in agenda-setting for other regimes.”71  As a result, they 
find that while “most global regulatory agendas are set by the US; if the EC vetoes those 
agendas, they go nowhere.”72   
In sum, effective cooperation between the world’s two economic powers offers 
the promise of joint gains for both sides and more effective global leadership on 
regulatory matters. Yet a careful cross-sectoral analysis of transatlantic economic 
relations demonstrates that their cooperation varies significantly by issue area, limiting 
the two sides’ ability to exercise joint leadership in global governance.73  This variation 
reflects the distributive implications of the governance alternatives respectively favoured 
by the US and EU.  It is to these distributive issues that we now turn.   
 
B. The Challenge of Distributive Conflict 
Despite the general promise of regimes in fostering international cooperation to 
achieve joint gains, international relations scholars have identified a number of potential 
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obstacles to successful regime-based cooperation.74 We focus in this chapter on two such 
impediments:  the problems of distributive conflict (discussed in this section) and of 
fragmented regime complexes (discussed in section C below).  Distributive conflicts, we 
note immediately, need not arise from narrow economic or protectionist motives on the 
part of states, but can and do reflect different configurations of interests, institutional 
procedures and ideological and cultural perspectives at the national level — in other 
words, different interests, institutions and ideas – which in turn shape the regulatory 
preferences of states at the international level.75   
International law theorists, taking from regime theory in international relations, 
often point to the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game in assessing the role of international 
law.  To give one leading example, Andrew Guzman in his impressive book How 
International Law Works, writes, “It is in the context of [the prisoner’s dilemma] game 
that the theory is applied throughout most of this book.”76  The distributive challenge to 
regime theory calls into question the appropriateness of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game as 
the proper model for most instances of international cooperation because it fails to 
capture the potential for distributive conflicts among the participants.  In the classic PD 
model, states are assumed to have a common interest in reaching a cooperative outcome, 
and the primary impediment to successful cooperation is the fear that other states will 
cheat on their agreements.  In PD models of international relations, these problems are 
typically addressed by creating mechanisms for the monitoring of state behavior and the 
sanctioning of states that violate the terms of the agreement — i.e. international law.  If 
PD is an accurate description of the situation facing states, then international regimes and 
international hard and soft law should indeed facilitate cooperation by monitoring 
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compliance and (in the case of  hard law dispute-settlement bodies) by providing for 
enforcement.   
However, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game deemphasizes another important obstacle 
to successful cooperation, namely conflicts among states with different interests over the 
distribution of the costs and benefits of cooperation.77  That is to say, when states 
cooperate in international politics, they do not simply choose between “cooperation” and 
“defection,” the binary choices available in PD games, but rather they choose specific 
terms of cooperation, such as the specific level of various tariffs in a trade regime, or the 
precise levels of greenhouse gas emissions in an environmental regime, and so on. As 
James Morrow notes, “There is only one way to cooperate in prisoners’ dilemma; there 
are many ways to cooperate in the real world.”78  In game-theoretic terms, there may be 
multiple equilibria – multiple possible agreements that both sides prefer to the status quo 
– and states face the challenge of choosing among these many possible agreements.  
Different terms of cooperation can have different distributive implications, 
affecting states’ calculation of costs and benefits, both economically and politically.   In 
an international trade agreement, for example, one side may prefer to drastically reduce 
tariffs on industrial goods, while another may place a stronger emphasis on reducing 
agricultural tariffs or agricultural subsidies.  In this view, states face not only the 
challenge of monitoring and enforcing compliance with a trade agreement, as in the PD 
model, but also of deciding on the terms of cooperation.  Yet PD models, with their 
binary choice of cooperation or defection and their emphasis on Pareto-improving 
outcomes, fail to capture these elements of international cooperation.  
We therefore offer three specific, overlapping arguments that are most relevant to 
international regulatory cooperation and the use of hard and soft law instruments toward 
that end. 
First, regime theory, with its emphasis on PD and collective-action models, has 
under-emphasized both distributive conflict and the role of state power in determining the 
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outcome of regulatory conflicts. This, in turn, has affected international law scholarship, 
much of which has welcomed regime theory for its validation of international law’s role.  
In international politics, as Stephen Krasner argues, efforts at cooperation often take the 
form of a Battle of the Sexes game, in which different states have clear preferences for 
different international standards.79 Even if all states benefit from a common standard, 
raising the prospect of joint gains, the distribution of those gains depends on the specific 
standard chosen, and the primary question is whether and how states can secure 
cooperation on their preferred terms.   
Put differently, Krasner argues, the most important question is not whether to 
move toward the “Pareto frontier” of mutually beneficial cooperation, but which point on 
the Pareto frontier will be chosen.  Under such circumstances, he suggests, outcomes are 
determined primarily by the use of state power, which may be employed in one of three 
ways:  (1) to determine who may play the game (regime membership); (2) to dictate the 
rules of the game (or our purposes, whether through hard or soft law), including the 
possibility of a single state moving first and imposing a de facto standard on others; and 
(3) to employ issue-linkages, including through the application of threats and promises in 
related issue-areas, to change the payoff matrix for other states and induce those states to 
accept one’s preferred standards.80  Krasner views such coordination regimes as stable 
and self-enforcing, yet this self-enforcing nature of the regime should not obscure the fact 
that the regime produces winners (who secure cooperation on terms closer to their 
preferences) and losers (forced to cooperate on terms favorable to others), and that state 
power plays a key role in determining the shape of the regime and the standards adopted 
under the regime.  
We should, therefore, expect the outcome of a Battle of the Sexes game to be 
determined in large part by powerful states, with weaker players being excluded from 
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negotiations, or forced to accept a fait accompli, or induced to accept powerful states’ 
terms through threats and promises in related issue-areas. In the global regulatory 
context, therefore, we would expect the United States and the European Union to play 
dominant roles in bargaining, with smaller countries being placed in a difficult situation 
when the US and the EU agree, as well as when they clash. When the US and EU agree, 
smaller countries will be under considerable pressure to adapt to US and EU standards.  
When the US and EU disagree, smaller countries may have a greater range of choices, on 
the one hand, but they may face considerable countervailing pressures on the other, 
caught between the US-EU conflict.  
 Second, distributive conflict is not unique to Battle of the Sexes games, but 
emerges as a generic and nearly ubiquitous feature of all international cooperation.  By 
contrast with the approach of situation-structuralists in international relations theory who 
distinguish among different types of game contexts,81 James Fearon has argued in a 
landmark article that it is misleading to attempt to characterize international cooperation 
over any given issue as either a Prisoners’ Dilemma or a Battle game.  Rather, Fearon 
maintains,  
… understanding strategic problems of international cooperation as having a 
common strategic structure is more accurate and perhaps more theoretically 
fruitful.  Empirically, there are always many possible ways to arrange an arms, 
trade, financial or environmental treaty, and before states can cooperate to enforce 
an agreement they must bargain to decide which one to implement.  Thus, 
regardless of the substantive domain, problems of international cooperation 
involve first a bargaining problem (akin to the various coordination games that 
have been studied) and next an enforcement problem (akin to a Prisoners’ 
Dilemma game).82     
More specifically, Fearon models international cooperation as a two-stage game in which 
states first agree on the terms of cooperation, and then establish any monitoring and 
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sanctioning provisions necessary for enforcement.  Linking these two stages into a single 
game provides useful insights into the significant challenges of successful international 
cooperation.  For example, a long “shadow of the future” can lessen problems of 
enforcement, by reassuring the players that the game is an iterated one and that 
compliance will be rewarded and noncompliance punished over the long haul.  By the 
same token, however, a long shadow of the future can exacerbate distributional conflicts:  
If states know that the rules and standards they adopt will bind them and their successors 
for many years to come, they will have a greater incentive to bargain hard and to hold out 
for their preferred standard, knowing that it can shape the patterns of gains and losses 
well into the future.83 In this view, enforceable, hard law agreements may increase the 
shadow of the future and hence make bargaining more difficult, whereas soft law 
instruments may make enforcement more problematic but alleviate distributional 
conflicts in bargaining.   
Third, the setting of international regulatory standards is particularly prone to 
distributive conflicts, and international standard setting can and should be theorized as a 
coordination game that often creates incentives for parties to engage in strategic 
bargaining.  Some standard-setting negotiations may take the form of a “pure 
coordination” game, in which the various participants are entirely indifferent among the 
possible standards to be adopted.84  Indeed, the constructivist or “world society” literature 
depicts international standard setting as an essentially technocratic and deliberative 
process in which calculations of interest and power recede into the background.85  
However, as Walter Mattli and Tim Büthe have argued convincingly, almost any 
potential international standard is likely to have varying distributive implications for 
states and firms, and so we can expect actors to attempt to “export” their domestic 
standards to the international level, minimizing their adaptation costs, while their trading 
partners and competitors are forced to adapt and adjust to a new and different standard.86  
Negotiating environmental, health and safety standards where they have significant trade 
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implications, for example, can be particularly difficult because of the distributional 
stakes.87 
  
C. The Challenge of Fragmented Regime Conflicts 
Thus far, we have argued that the making of international regulations, both hard 
and soft, is likely to be characterized by sharp distributive conflict, with outcomes being 
decided in large part by dominant economic powers such as the US and the EU.  This 
distributive conflict, we now argue, may take a distinctive form in issue-areas that are 
characterized by a proliferation of hard and soft law rules and regimes.  Preliminary 
formulations of the concept of international regimes identified regimes by specific issue-
areas.88 Yet an increasing number of real-world problems do not fall neatly within the 
jurisdiction of a single regime, but rather lie at the intersection of multiple regimes. These 
overlapping regimes result in a regime complex, which Kal Raustiala and David Victor 
have defined as: “an array of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions 
governing a particular issue-area.” As they state,  
 
Regime complexes are marked by the existence of several legal agreements that 
are created and maintained in distinct fora with participation of different sets of 
actors.  The rules in these elemental regimes functionally overlap, yet there is no 
agreed upon hierarchy for resolving conflicts between rules.  Disaggregated 
decision making in the international legal system means that agreements reached 
in one forum do not automatically extend to, or clearly trump, agreements 
developed in other forums.89  
 
Decision-making in these regime complexes is characterized by several distinctive 
features, of which we emphasize three in terms of their implications for hard and soft law 
interaction.   
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First, negotiations in a given regime will not begin with a blank slate but will 
typically demonstrate “path dependence,” taking into account developments in related 
international regimes, and, in particular for our purposes, the WTO-trade regime. Second, 
individual states, responding to domestic political contexts and seeking to advance their 
interests, will engage in “forum shopping,” selecting particular regimes that are most 
likely to support their preferred outcomes.  More specifically, states will select regimes 
based on characteristics such as their membership (e.g., bilateral, restricted or universal), 
voting rules (e.g. one-state-one-vote vs. weighted voting, and consensus vs. majority 
voting), institutional characteristics (e.g., presence or absence of dispute-settlement 
procedures), substantive focus (e.g. trade finance, environment or food safety), and 
predominant functional representation (e.g. by trade, finance, environment or agricultural 
ministries), each of which might be expected to influence substantive outcomes in more 
or less predictable ways.90   
Third, the dense array of institutions in a given regime complex will create legal 
inconsistencies among them. States will respond to these inconsistencies with efforts 
either to demarcate clear boundaries among various regimes, or to assert the primacy or 
hierarchy of one regime over the others, in reflection of a state’s substantive preferences. 
States may engage in “strategic inconsistency,” attempting through one regime to create 
conflict or inconsistency in another in the hopes of shifting the understanding or actual 
adaptation of the rules in that other regime in a particular direction. Powerful states are 
likely to be particularly adept at such forum shopping.91  
The political science analysis of overlapping regimes is complemented by a 
growing legal literature about the “pluralism” and “fragmentation” of international law.92 
In 2000, for example, the International Law Commission (ILC) included the topic “Risks 
ensuing from the fragmentation of international law” into its work program, and in 2002 
it created a Study Group to make recommendations concerning the topic, renamed 
“Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising from the diversification and 
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expansion of international law.”93 For many international lawyers, the result of such 
fragmentation is legal uncertainty and potential conflict between international legal 
regimes.94 As the 2006 ILC report states:  
 
[W]hat once appeared to be governed by “general international law” has become 
the field of operation for such specialist systems as “trade law,” “human rights 
law,” “environmental law,” “law of the sea,” “European law”… each possessing 
their own principles and institutions. The problem, as lawyers have seen it, is that 
such specialized law-making and institution-building tends to take place with 
relative ignorance of legislative and institutional activities in the adjoining fields 
and of the general principles and practices of international law. The result is 
conflicts between rules or rule-systems, deviating institutional practices and, 
possibly, the loss of an overall perspective on the law.95  
 
Scholars disagree regarding the causes of such fragmentation and whether 
fragmentation is positive or negative for international law, but they largely concur on its 
development.96 Many legal scholars view this development as a manifestation of the rise 
of a global legal pluralism, which refers to “the presence in a social field of more than 
one legal order.”97 As a theory or analytic framework, legal pluralism differs from much 
of regime theory in that it challenges monist conceptions of the state and of state 
interests, and rather emphasizes the interaction between distinct normative orders — state 
and non-state — while deemphasizing the role of formal texts.  In this sense, legal 
pluralism has a “radically heterogeneous” conception of law and social order, taking a 
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post-modernist, constructivist orientation that focuses on social diversity and informality 
more than on formal rules and hierarchic authority.98  
Although legal pluralism and theories of regime complexes have quite different 
starting points, in particular regarding their conceptions of the role of states, they both 
raise the question of how legal regimes interact and potentially constrain one another 
where there is no central authority.  As Roderick Macdonald writes from a legal pluralist 
perspective, “[d]ifferent legal regimes are in constant interaction, mutually influencing 
the emergence of each other’s rules, processes and institutions.”99  These regimes are not 
“self-contained,”100 in a way that some positivist legal commentators fear, but rather 
exercise normative pressure on each other, as we will demonstrate below. Lines of 
communication between regimes exist, but, crucially, there is no hierarchy imposing a 
particular discipline.  We are interested in the interaction of “harder” and “softer” forms 
of international law within a regime complex, which calls into question much of the 
previous theorizing about them.   
 
III. Hard and Soft Law Interaction as Antagonists 
 
Having discussed the significance of distributive conflict and regime complexes 
for international cooperation in general, we are now ready to return to the issue of how 
hard and soft law interact in the international realm.  We contend that careful scrutiny of 
the interaction of hard and soft law instruments within a fragmented international law 
system demonstrates that they are not necessarily mutually supportive, but also can 
counteract and undermine each other under certain conditions.  More precisely, 
individual states may deliberately use soft-law instruments to undermine hard-law rules 
to which they object, or vice-versa, creating an antagonistic relationship between these 
legal instruments.  The scope conditions for such behavior, we argue, are determined by 
the two factors discussed in the previous section, namely distributive conflict and regime 
complexes.  Where distributive conflict is low, we have argued, states are likely to utilize 
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hard- and soft-law instruments selectively, adopting each type of instrument for its 
relative strengths, and utilizing those instruments in a complementary fashion, i.e. with 
soft law provisions either supplementing existing hard law or leading the way to new 
hard law in an evolutionary process.  In situations of intense distributive conflict, 
however, the content of international norms and rules are fundamentally contested by 
states, which therefore have an incentive to use soft law to undermine hard law 
provisions to which they object, and vice-versa.  Put differently, distributive conflict 
provides an incentive for states to contest, undermine, and possibly replace legal 
provisions – hard and soft – to which they object.   
Within a single international regime, states are likely to enjoy limited 
opportunities to contest and undermine existing legal provisions, particularly if the new 
provisions are enacted under a stable membership and institutional rules.  In a fragmented 
regime complex, however, the prospects for antagonistic interaction of hard and soft law 
increase dramatically.  Even in the absence of sharp distributive conflict among states, 
different regimes are likely to be characterized by different memberships, decision rules, 
and substantive foci, creating tensions and inconsistencies among both hard and soft 
international norms and rules.  These problems of coordination, however, are likely to be 
magnified substantially insofar as states engage in distributive conflict over the content of 
international regulations.  In such instances, we may expect states to engage in the full 
range of forum-shopping strategies discussed in the literature on regime complexes and 
international law fragmentation, using hard or soft law provisions in favored regimes to 
counter or undermine legal developments in neighboring regimes.  Put differently, if 
distributive conflicts provide states with an incentive to use hard and soft law instruments 
strategically, the existence of international regime complexes increases their 
opportunities to do so.   
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Our argument is summarized in Table 1, which illustrates our expectations about 




and regime complexes.  Where distributive conflict is low and regimes can be easily 
isolated, as in the upper left-hand cell, states have little incentive to undermine existing 
law, and hard and soft law are likely to interact and evolve in complementary ways, 
reflecting the existing literature.  In the lower left-hand cell, we imagine a world in which 
distributive conflict is again low, but regime complexes coexist with no hierarchical 
structure, such as when an issue area comprises multiple functional domains.  Here, we 
would not expect states to actively contest or undermine existing legal provisions, but we 
would anticipate some coordination problems among regimes with different 
memberships, decision rules, and substantive foci. 
Compare these two outcomes to those in the right-hand column, where 
distributive conflict is high.  Where states engage in distributive conflict within a single, 
isolated regime, as in the upper-right cell, states will have an incentive to undermine 
existing legal provisions, but their opportunities for doing so will be limited, in particular 
because most international organizations operate by consensus decision-making so that 
any state benefiting from existing law could block adoption of countervailing legal 
instruments.101  In fact, however, we would expect this scenario to be relatively rare, for 
the simple reason that distributive conflict among states provides a strong incentive for 
states that are dissatisfied with a given regime to press for the creation or development of 
new regimes to compete with or undermine existing regimes, particularly insofar as the 
existing regime is resistant to change.  Put differently, the choice to create new regimes 
is, at least in part, endogenous to the presence of distributive conflict, which would tend 
to push outcomes from the upper right-hand cell to the lower right-hand cell, where 
distributive conflicts are present and multiple regimes overlap in a single issue-area.  In 
such cases, we argue, states enjoy both an incentive and an opportunity to act 
strategically, by forum shopping, favoring some regimes over others, and using hard- and 
soft-law instruments to advocate their preferred norms and rules and undermine those to 
which they are opposed.  
                                                 
101 However, where there are different bodies operating within a single organization, it is possible for hard 
and soft law to act as antagonists. For example, UN General Assembly resolutions could be purposefully 
adopted to counter existing hard law, whether the hard law is created by the UN Security Council, the 




In such settings, we can imagine multiple combinations of overlapping and 
competing hard- and soft- law regimes asserting jurisdiction over a given issue.  For a 
state that is certain of its interests and intent on undermining an existing regime, for 
example, new hard law provisions would most likely be preferable, ceteris paribus, and 
we find some examples of states establishing such conflicting hard-law regimes below. In 
practice, however, states often choose instruments of a relatively softer law nature to 
counter existing hard law, as our examples will show.  We can imagine several reasons 
for such a choice.  One explanation may be that states do not wish to counter existing 
hard law directly for systemic reasons, but rather prefer to soften it indirectly, such as 
through affecting the interpretation of the existing hard law, and thus its precision and 
clarity. Thus, even when states choose a formally hard law instrument, the instrument 
may be soft along the dimension of delegation in order to avoid two judicial bodies 
pronouncing on a single issue in distinct regimes.  Another explanation may be that the 
existing hard law is of a broad scope of coverage, such as the rules of the World Trade 
Organization, so that states do not wish to undermine the overall system, but merely 
affect the operation of some legal provisions within the existing regime.  Another 
explanation may be, from a constructivist perspective, that the existing hard law exercises 
some normative pull so that states find it difficult to find a sufficient number of allied 
states to enter into a new hard law instrument that directly counters the existing one.  
Finally, it may be that some (revisionist) states, dissatisfied with existing regimes, do 
indeed press for conflicting hard law provisions, but are unable to secure the agreement 
of other (status-quo) parties on such provisions, and fall back on soft law agreements as a 
second-best alternative.  
Regardless of the specific combinations of hard and soft law provisions, our 
central point is that, in the presence of distributive conflict and fragmented regime 
complexes, the interaction of hard and soft law is likely to be not complementary but 
antagonistic, with the strengths of each regime being undermined through such 
interaction.  In such a setting, we contend, soft law provisions are likely to be 
“hardened,” losing many of the purported advantages of soft law such as experimentation 
and flexibility as a result of their link to hard law regimes.  Hard law provisions, by 




forced to weigh the black-letter provisions of one regime against the competing 
normative provisions of neighboring regimes.  This scenario, moreover, is more than 
simply a theoretical possibility:  If distributive conflict over the terms of cooperation is 
ubiquitous, as we have argued above, and if a given issue is subject to multiple regimes in 
the ever-thickening web of international norms, rules, and institutions, then we may 
expect hard and soft law to interact antagonistically across a broad range of issues in 
international politics.  To illustrate this argument empirically, we begin in this section 
with the case of agricultural biotechnology, an area of international regulation that has 
been subject to both distributional conflict and a well-developed regime complex, before 
moving in Part IV to articulate additional hypotheses and examine a range of additional 
empirical cases.  
As we have demonstrated at length elsewhere, the US and EU have taken sharply 
divergent approaches to the regulation of agricultural biotechnology.102  Simplifying only 
slightly, the United States has, since the 1980s, adopted a set of regulations that treated 
genetically modified (GM) foods as largely equivalent to their conventional counterparts, 
which contributed in turn to the early adoption of agricultural biotechnology by US firms 
and farmers.  In the European Union, by contrast, regulators and publics have taken a far 
more cautious approach to genetically modified organisms (GMOs), treating genetically 
modified foods and crops as different from their conventional counterparts, and adopting 
increasingly strict and complex regulatory procedures for their approval and marketing. 
Unlike in the United States, GM foods and crops face considerable regulatory hurdles in 
the EU, including requirements for mandatory pre-approval of all GM products, as well 
as provisions on the mandatory labeling and traceability of all GM products, which have 
made it difficult and sometimes impossible for US farmers to export genetically modified 
foods to markets in Europe.  They also face greater social resistance, with activists 
campaigning against GM foods and ripping up GM crops from fields, and public opinion 
far more mobilized over GM foods than in the United States.  Reflecting this “regulatory 
polarization,” US and EU negotiators have demonstrated sharply divergent preferences 
over global GMO regulation, with each side consistently seeking to export its own 
                                                 




approach to the global level.  The level of distributive conflict in this area is, therefore, 
high. 
This transatlantic dispute over GMO regulation, moreover, has played out against 
the backdrop of a regime complex comprising both soft law regimes, including the non-
binding guidelines and recommendations issued by the OECD and Codex, alongside 
regimes having more hard law characteristics, such as the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol 
and the World Trade Organization, the latter of which combines relatively detailed, 
legally binding rules with a particularly strong system of third-party dispute settlement to 
interpret and enforce them.  In this setting, both the US and the EU have attempted to 
export their different approaches to various international regimes, engaging in “forum-
shopping” to find particularly hospitable regimes, and producing awkward compromises 
within, as well as inconsistencies among, various international regimes. In the process, 
soft and hard law mechanisms have not interacted in a complementary and progressive 
manner, as theorized in the existing literature, but rather served to constrain and undercut 
each other.  More flexible soft law regimes like the Codex Alimentarius Commission 
have been “hardened” by concerns over the implications of their decisions in the hard law 
WTO regime, while the hard law WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Standards (SPS Agreement) has been “softened,” being made more flexible and less 
predictable as the WTO judicial process has sought means to avoid deciding the 
substantive issues in dispute.   
Let us explain how this has worked in some detail.  The existing WTO regime 
favors the US position that any import restrictions of genetically modified (GM) products 
must be based on a scientific risk assessment, even if the regulatory restrictions apply 
equally to domestically produced and imported products. From the perspective of the EU, 
the 1992 Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), one of a series of framework agreements 
adopted at the 1992 Conference on Environment and Development at Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil, offered a promising alternative forum for the regulation of GM products.  In 
particular, it offered a forum within which the EU could press for an international 
environmental agreement supporting its precautionary approach to biotech regulation.  
Thanks to EU entrepreneurship, countries adopted a new Biosafety Protocol to the CBD 




The United States attempted to block adoption of the Protocol but was 
unsuccessful. The US nonetheless actively participated in the negotiations, including over 
the drafting of a provision governing the relationship of the Biosafety Protocol to the 
WTO agreements.  The US demanded a “savings clause” to preserve WTO rights because 
otherwise there would be an argument under international law that conflicting provisions 
in a treaty signed last in time prevail over those in a prior treaty (known as lex 
posteriori).103  The US obtained such a clause, but it failed to obtain a clear reservation of 
its WTO rights.104  Rather, references to other “international agreements” were only made 
in the Protocol’s preamble, and these references are in tension with each other. The 
preamble provides that “this Protocol shall not be interpreted as implying a change in the 
rights and obligations of a Party under any existing international agreements.”  The next 
phrase, however, states that “the above recital is not intended to subordinate this Protocol 
to other international agreements.”  As an EU representative stated, the two clauses 
effectively “cancel each other out,” leaving the legal relationship between the two 
regimes unclear and allowing both sides to claim a partial victory.105  The EU, therefore, 
could point to the Biosafety Protocol as evidence of an international consensus (involving 
over 140 parties). It could (and did) modify its existing legislation to comply with its 
international commitments under the Biosafety Protocol, pointing to these international 
obligations in its defense against the United States’ WTO challenge to the EU’s biotech 
regime in 2003.  From a legal positivist perspective, the Biosafety Protocol is a form of 
“hard” law as its rules are binding on the parties to it, but it is “softer” than the WTO 
regime along a hard-soft law continuum, since third-party dispute settlement is not 
central to its operation. 
 Overall, the EU has found a more favorable forum in the Biosafety Protocol to 
fashion international rules and norms that contain its “fingerprints,” coinciding with and 
supporting its regulatory approach to agricultural biotechnology. In particular, the 
Protocol has created new rules providing for the application of the precautionary 
principle in national decision-making, and the requirement of labeling of Living Modified 
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Organisms (LMOs) in conformity with an importing country’s requirements. In addition, 
discussion continues regarding risk assessment and risk management principles, 
including the taking into account of “socio-economic considerations” in regulatory 
approvals, as well as liability rules. In this way, the Protocol serves as a counterweight to 
the WTO SPS Agreement’s narrower focus on science-based justifications for SPS 
measures affecting trade.  
 Both the US and EU also attempted to export their policies to a third organization, 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex), an intergovernmental body established in 
1962 by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) to facilitate international trade in food through the adoption of 
international food-safety standards, which consisted of 178 members by early 2008.  
Traditionally the US and EU have driven Codex agendas and still do so to a large extent. 
Each works to find allies for its own positions.  
Codex traditionally represented a form of soft law, since the standards were not 
binding and, by definition, there was no need for a dispute settlement system to enforce 
them.106  The process for producing Codex standards involves committees of experts 
which are established to deliberate over the appropriate standards. A designated Codex 
committee elaborates a draft standard or guideline subject to comments by member 
governments and interested international organizations. Once the process is completed, 
standards are approved by the full Codex Alimentarius Commission, which meets once 
every two years.  
Overall, Codex became a sort of gentleman’s club – or epistemic community – of 
food specialists, based on the following characteristics: 
 
“(1) the position of Codex as relatively isolated from international hard 
law and politics, (2) the voluntary nature of Codex activities and output, 
(3) agreed-upon norms, which restrained members from both obstructing 
the process of elaborating new Codex standards and from letting trade 
                                                 




considerations override all other considerations, and (4) lack of sanctions 
in situations where [standards are] not followed.”107 
 
Those attending Codex meetings were (and the majority remain) food safety experts, 
often with technical scientific backgrounds from national administrations and industry.108 
Although only governments can vote, the process has often been driven by industry, 
which seeks to reduce compliance costs resulting from multiple national regulations.  
The situation of the Codex, however, changed considerably with the creation of 
the WTO and the adoption of the SPS Agreement in 1995. Under the WTO’s SPS 
Agreement, implementation of a Codex standard creates a presumption of compliance 
with “harder” WTO law provisions, subject to binding dispute settlement. More 
precisely, article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement provides that WTO members shall base their 
food safety standards on international standards, guidelines and recommendations 
(specifying those of Codex), subject to certain exceptions. Article 3.2 further states that a 
member’s conformity with these international standards shall be presumed to comply 
with WTO law. These SPS provisions have significantly increased the significance of 
Codex standards, providing a significant impetus to harmonization activities, but also 
“hardening” Codex decision-making by providing US and EU negotiators with an 
incentive both to export and to protect their respective regulatory standards. 
 The effect of Codex standards became clear in the US-EU trade dispute over the 
EU’s ban on beef produced with growth hormones. In 1995, at the first Codex session 
following the creation of the WTO, the United States strategically “forced a vote and the 
adoption of Codex standards” covering five bovine growth hormones, winning the vote 
by a 33-29 margin, with seven abstentions.109 It was hardly a consensus decision, but it 
was enough to establish a “voluntary” international Codex standard under the 
organization’s voting rules. Shortly afterwards, the U.S. initiated its WTO complaint 
against the EU, contending that the EU’s ban was not “based” on an international 
(Codex) standard as required by the SPS Agreement.  
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Since then, the United States and European countries have placed increasing 
importance on the negotiation of new regulatory principles and standards within Codex, 
since these principles and standards may be invoked (and already have been invoked) in 
the decisions of WTO panels and of the Appellate Body. As a European Commission 
representative before Codex concludes, “In the past, if we disagreed with Codex 
standards or Code of Practice, we could ignore it and take our own legislation. Now we 
can’t.”110 In response, states began sending more than food experts and food agency 
officials to Codex meetings, complementing them with “delegates from the diplomatic 
services and ministries of trade, industry, finance, and foreign affairs.” In an empirical 
study, Veggeland and Borden note an increase of such representatives to the Codex 
Committee on General Principles from 10 in 1992, to 32 in 2000, to 41 in 2001.111  
The Codex process has encountered particularly severe difficulties in addressing 
issues that implicate risk management policy over transgenic varieties. Three Codex sub-
groups have addressed them: the Committee on General Principles (regarding the use of 
the precautionary principle and “other legitimate factors” besides science in risk 
management); the Committee on Labeling (regarding the labeling of GM foods); and the 
Committee on Food Import and Export Inspection and Certification Systems (regarding 
the issue of traceability). Here, we find arduous negotiations between the US and EU, 
each of which put forward distinctive and sharply opposed proposals for international 
standards and guidelines on issues that could have a direct bearing on the application of 
the SPS Agreement to national regulatory measures, and in particular in the WTO biotech 
case that the US initiated in 2003, resulting in deadlock in the soft law Codex regime.112 
The results of these negotiations in the purportedly soft law Codex forum have 
not produced consensus.  Like the paragraphs of the Cartagena Protocol dealing with the 
relation between Cartagena and WTO law, much of these Codex texts simply paper over 
rather than settle the differences among the parties, potentially delegating clarification of 
these issues, if at all, to the WTO dispute settlement system. Rather than hard law and 
soft law working in coordination toward genuine “problem-solving,” the hard law of the 
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WTO has constrained and to some extent “hardened” what was supposed to be a flexible, 
“voluntary” process for harmonized rule-making and guidance to facilitate trade in 
agricultural products. Strategic bargaining in defense of trade interests has often replaced 
technical discussions. As Victor writes, we are now more likely to see “dueling experts,” 
reflecting US adversarial legalism, than “independent expert panels” working 
collaboratively to “synthesize complex technical information.”113 As Veggeland and 
Borgen add, we now see a “replication of WTO coalition[s] and positioning pattern[s] in 
the Codex.”114 An organization in which decision-making was formerly based primarily 
on a “logic of arguing” based on deliberation has been transformed to one more 
frequently based on a “logic of consequentiality” based on bargaining. 
The United States was concerned with the spread of regulation in other countries 
restricting the growth and sale of GM products, which was spurred and legitimated by the 
Biosafety Protocol.  In response, the United States finally brought a WTO complaint 
against EU regulatory measures in 2003, which the US hoped would have significant 
implications for other countries’ practices.  After considerable delay, the WTO dispute-
settlement panel finally issued its decision in September 2006.  The underlying conflict 
over the conflicting US and EU regulatory approaches, however, arguably affected the 
panel’s decision.  The impact of the panel’s decision would be felt outside the trade 
regime, in both domestic law and politics and in the international regimes regulating 
other aspects of agricultural biotechnology.  As a result, we contend, the WTO hard law 
dispute settlement system adopted a cautious approach in its interpretation and 
application of the SPS Agreement, providing less clarity as to members’ SPS 
commitments, arguably reducing their credibility.  In effect, we argue, the linkage of the 
agricultural biotechnology issue to other substantive regimes helped to “soften” the effect 
of WTO hard law, which lost several of the defining characteristics of hard law in 
practice.  As a result, we find that the SPS Agreement was effectively made less binding 
in practice in this case, for reasons that we now explain.  
Even though the panel’s decision weighed in at over one thousand pages of text, 
the panel expressly avoided examining many crucial issues, most particularly the 
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questions “whether biotech products in general are safe or not” and “whether the biotech 
products at issue in this dispute are ‘like’ their conventional counterparts.”  The panel did 
find in favor of the United States, but largely on procedural and not substantive grounds, 
with less hard law substantive bite.  As a result, the substantive outcome and application 
of SPS rules remain unclear.  As regards measures adopted at the EU level, the panel only 
found that the EU had engaged in “undue delay” in its approval process.  The panel found 
that because of this delay, the EU had never taken an actual “SPS measure.”  On these 
grounds, the panel did not examine the EU’s actions under the SPS Agreement’s 
substantive provisions.  It thus avoided determining whether the EU had violated its 
obligation to base a decision on a risk assessment, or whether any assessments showed 
greater risks of GM varieties than for conventional plant varieties, or whether the EU was 
consistent in its application of food safety regulations, or whether the EU could adopt 
regulations that are less-trade restrictive while accomplishing its safety objectives.  
Regarding safeguards enacted by EU member states, in contrast, the panel found that all 
of them were “SPS measures” that violated the EU’s substantive obligations under article 
5.1 of the SPS Agreement because they were “not based on a risk assessment.”   
However, the panel only reached this conclusion by looking to risk assessments already 
conducted at the EU level, finding that the member-state bans were inconsistent with the 
EU’s internal risk assessment findings.  
Even though the WTO biotech panel found that the Biosafety Protocol’s 
provisions did not apply because the United States is not a party to the Protocol, panelists 
can implicitly take the Protocol into account.  They can do so through their appreciation 
of the political stakes of alternative interpretations of WTO rules (from a rationalist 
perspective), and through the Protocol’s impact on the framing and broader social 
understanding of the issues (from a constructivist one).  The existence of the Protocol can 
affect the interpretation of WTO legal provisions and the appreciation of the underlying 
facts of the case to which WTO law is applied. Moreover, it is simply not in the interest 
of the WTO as an organization to ignore the content of an international environmental 
agreement, especially one having over 140 parties.  In the context of agricultural 
biotechnology regulation, the CBD’s Biosafety Protocol has created normative pressure 




WTO judges, both panelists and the members of the Appellate Body, have some 
independent agency. They are not only interpreters and appliers of WTO legal provisions. 
The pattern of their jurisprudence suggests that they also assume a mediating role.  The 
WTO Appellate Body and judicial panels at times have an incentive to write opinions that 
are slightly ambiguous, leading to different interpretations as to how they can be 
implemented.  In this way, they can shape their decisions, especially in hard cases, to 
facilitate amicable settlement, and thereby uphold the WTO legal system from normative 
challenge.   
In doing so, however, they render the WTO’s hard law text less clear, and thus 
less binding in practice.  For example, through finding that neither the EU general nor 
product-specific moratoria were “SPS measures,” the panel left a WTO decision over the 
crucial substantive issue of whether EU-level decision-making was based on a scientific 
risk assessment for another day.  As regards the member state safeguard measures, the 
panel found that they were inconsistent with the EU’s substantive WTO commitments to 
base SPS measures on a risk assessment, but did so by relying on risk assessments 
conducted by the EU itself.  The panel even indicated a means for the EU to comply with 
SPS requirements, including for member state safeguards, in a manner that would 
enhance EU discretion.115  The panel decision was not unique to the GMO case.   As we 
have discussed elsewhere, even before the panel’s GMO decision, the jurisprudence of 
the Appellate Body indicated a willingness to provide significant discretion to domestic 
regulators regarding SPS measures.116  
Under the panel’s reasoning, only once the EU actually makes a decision which 
results in an “SPS measure” regarding a GM variety may a complainant bring a 
substantive claim.  In such case, the complainant would have to restart the process from 
scratch.  A panel would have to be formed and experts consulted.  The actual delay in the 
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panel making a decision on the substance of EU decision-making will thus be much 
longer than the three and half years that the case formally took (not to count subsequent 
procedures regarding the EU’s implementation of the ruling), if indeed a new claim is 
ever filed. The panel thereby effectively parried deciding on the substance of EU 
decision-making.  The panel’s delay can be viewed in socio-legal terms. The panel was 
not anxious to make a substantive decision on EU procedures regarding the politically 
controversial issue of GMOs, resulting in a softening of the binding nature of the WTO 
commitments in question.117 
In sum, the intense politicization of the issue, and the entrenchment of two 
sharply divergent regulatory systems governing the world’s two largest economies meant 
that the various multilateral negotiations on agricultural biotechnology resembled a Battle 
of the Sexes game, in which each side sought common international standards on its own 
terms.  These various regimes have interacted, but the result has been some “hardening” 
of the soft law regimes like Codex, and to some “softening” (and more flexibility and less 
predictability) of the hard law WTO dispute-settlement system.  The Codex has lost some 
of its traditional advantages as a soft law regime, growing more contentious, more 
difficult, and less deliberative over time because states are concerned about how its 
decisions can be used in the hard law WTO dispute-settlement system.  By contrast, the 
quintessential hard law regime of the WTO dispute settlement system has been softened 
somewhat, as panelists and Appellate Body members need to take into account not only 
political pressures from the member states, but also the growing overlaps, tensions, and 
conflicts between the WTO legal order and the provisions – both hard and soft – of 
neighboring international regimes. 
 
IV. Hypotheses as to the Interaction of Hard and Soft Law Instruments 
 
As we have now shown, although hard and soft law mechanisms can complement 
each other, they do not necessarily interact in a complementary, mutually reinforcing 
manner.  We advance three hypotheses as to how these tools operate in international 
                                                 




governance.  In each case, we refer to policy examples.  We offer these arguments as 
conjectures subject to further testing.  
1. Where the US and EU agree on a regulatory approach, we are more likely to 
see hard and soft law work as complements in an evolutionary manner.   
Because of US and EU collective market power, where the US and EU agree on a 
policy, it is much easier for them to promote it globally.  As Richard Steinberg writes 
regarding the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, for example, “[f]rom the time the 
transatlantic powers agreed to [a common] approach in 1990, they definitively dominated 
the agenda-setting process, that is, the formulation and drafting of texts that would be 
difficult to amend.”118 
We have seen many examples of this process.119  One side may initially be the 
primary entrepreneur behind the international regulatory initiative, eventually bringing 
the other side on board.  The US has often taken the lead in initiatives that have resulted 
in successful international regulatory cooperation, from international agreements to 
protect the ozone layer to the anti-bribery convention to the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations.   In both the ozone protection and anti-bribery cases, the initial instruments 
were of a soft law nature, and hard law agreements were reached once EU members were 
convinced of the benefits of a hard law approach.  Yet with the increased 
institutionalization and harmonization of European regulation at the EU level, the EU 
may likewise play an increasingly important entrepreneurial role in global governance.120  
Generally speaking, the success of international endeavors, from the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), to the Basel Committee, to the export 
credit soft law arrangement, depends on the cooperation of the US and the EU or its 
members.121 Indeed, we suggest that much of the existing literature on the 
complementary interaction of hard and soft law exhibits selection bias by drawing 
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disproportionately from cases in which the US and EU agree on the aims and terms of 
regulation because there are no, or only minimal distributive conflicts between them. 
 
2. Where the US and EU disagree on a regulatory approach, i.e., where there are 
distributive conflicts between them, we are more likely to see hard and soft law work in 
opposition to each other, especially where the issue in question is governed by multiple, 
overlapping regimes.  Given the fragmented nature of the international system, the US 
and EU will attempt to advance their interests in those regimes – both hard and soft law 
– that they find to be most favorable to their respective positions. 
Given the relatively equal economic power of the US and EU, where the two sides 
disagree on a policy position, they are relatively well-positioned to use their market 
power to offset each other’s efforts to export their own regulatory practices to the 
international level.  In these struggles, they look for allies to advance their aims, whether 
in an existing forum or a new one.  In many cases, the result of US-EU conflict will be 
either international instruments containing general language that does not take a position 
either way or competing international hard or soft law instruments. For example, 
competition law is an area where the US and EU often have convergent policies and the 
sides have collaborated in a soft law International Competition Network in promoting 
competition law globally.  However, the US and EU disagree regarding the appropriate 
policies toward dominant firms, reflected in their different approaches to Microsoft’s 
policies. As a result, the International Competition Network working group efforts on 
single firm dominance have resulted in recommendations that are at a high degree of 
generality because of disagreements between the US and Europe on these issues. 122 
We have shown how the US and EU have attempted to export their policy 
approaches in the area of agriculture biotechnology to different international regimes.  
Although the US formally won the WTO case, it has often appeared that the EU has been 
winning the struggle on the ground, since most countries signed the new Biosafety 
Protocol and have begun to implement domestic legislation to restrict the import and 
production of GM products, and to create stringent labeling requirements.  However, the 
                                                 





US has actively provided technical assistance around the world to develop local 
constituencies for the promotion of agricultural biotech.  The US has been somewhat 
successful as plantings have rapidly risen in the largest developing countries, and in 
particular in China, India, Brazil and Argentina.123  A number of these countries are 
members of the Biosafety Protocol.  Efforts under the Protocol to adopt more stringent 
labeling requirements have run into obstacles in the last years, as agricultural ministries 
have realized the potential impact of these requirements on agricultural trade.124  In the 
case of voluntary soft law-making in Codex, the US-EU conflict regarding risk 
management policies has given rise to hard bargaining resulting either in no agreement 
or, where some agreement is reached, in general compromise language that papers over 
the US-EU differences.  
We posit that the tension among international regimes will generally apply in 
trade and social policy issues where the US and EU take divergent positions, and that the 
WTO will lie at the center of inter-regime conflicts given its broad scope of coverage and 
its implications because of its hard law dispute settlement system.125  We provide a 
second example here.  The US and EU have long taken different positions regarding the 
regulation of trade in cultural products, and in particular films and other media.  This 
issue was particularly contentious during the Uruguay Round in which the EU pushed for 
an express “cultural exception,” while the US pressed for the liberalization of national 
policies.126  Neither side was fully successful.  The 1995 WTO General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) provides that countries are not bound to open their markets to 
audiovisual services unless they make express commitments, but it set up a framework 
for future negotiations that could lead to such liberalization, and the US was able to 
obtain commitments from some WTO members. The US ultimately failed, however, to 
obtain any EU commitments to open its market to audiovisual services under the 
GATS.127   
The EU then turned to a more favorable forum to advance its interests, the United 
Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).  In 2000, the 
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Council of Europe adopted a declaration on cultural diversity.  This European declaration 
helped to pave the way, in 2001, for UNESCO’s adoption of a Universal Declaration on 
Cultural Diversity, a soft law instrument.  UNESCO then turned to the drafting of a 
binding convention, the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 
Cultural Expressions, which 148 countries signed in October 2005.  Only two countries 
opposed it, the United States and Israel.  The United States “vehemently opposed” the 
convention throughout the negotiations, maintaining that it was protectionist and 
inappropriately implicated UNESCO in trade policy.128  The convention went into effect 
in March 2007. 
Although the convention is formally binding, its core provisions are defensive.  
As Christophe Beat Graber writes, “the principal role of the [Convention] will be to act as 
a counterpart to the WTO whenever conflicts between trade and culture arise.”129  Article 
1(g) of the convention, for example, provides that one of its objectives is “to give 
recognition to the distinctive nature of cultural activities, goods and services as vehicles 
of identity, values and meaning” — as opposed to having value only in economic terms.  
Article 5 of the convention then affirms the sovereign right of the parties “to formulate 
and implement their cultural polices and to adopt measures to protect and promote the 
diversity of cultural expressions and to strengthen international cooperation to achieve 
[such] purposes.”  Article 6 provides that each party “may adopt measures aimed at 
protecting and promoting the diversity of cultural expressions within its territory,” 
including “financial assistance” and other “regulatory measures.”  Article 8 goes further, 
maintaining that, “Parties may take all appropriate measures to protect and preserve 
cultural expressions in situations [where cultural expressions are] in need of urgent 
safeguarding.”   
Much of the rest of the convention is of a soft law nature.  In contrast to its 
recognition of parties’ rights, the convention only creates soft law obligations, such as for 
parties to further public awareness of cultural diversity’s importance (article 10), to 
acknowledge civil society’s role (article 11) and to generally exercise their “best efforts” 
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to implement the convention through cultural policy measures.130 The convention 
provides for dispute settlement, but it too is of a soft law nature, relying on negotiation, 
mediation and conciliation.131   The conciliation system, moreover, is non-binding, and 
parties may also opt out of it.  
A key issue thus became the relationship of the convention to other international 
treaties, and particularly the WTO agreements.  The convention provides another 
example of strategic ambiguity in this respect.  Article 20 of the convention states that, 
“without subordinating this convention to any other treaty,” the parties “shall foster 
mutual supportiveness” with other treaties and “take into account the relevant provisions” 
of the convention “when interpreting and applying … other treaties” and “when entering 
into other international obligations.”  At the same time, the article provides that “nothing 
in this Convention shall be interpreted as modifying rights and obligations of the Parties 
under any other treaties to which they are parties.”  
Article 20’s focus on the fostering of “mutual supportiveness” among treaty 
regimes can be read as an attempt to soften WTO rules to accommodate the convention’s 
norms.  The EU and other parties to the convention can now refer to an international 
convention that expressly notes their sovereign rights under international law to take 
measures, including trade measures, to protect their cultural diversity.  As the number of 
countries ratifying the convention grows, the convention, together with the 2001 
UNESCO Universal Declaration, could be viewed as emerging customary international 
law which applies to all nations except those non-signatories who persistently object to 
it.132   
The UNESCO convention could thus have an impact on future WTO negotiations 
and on future WTO cases involving cultural products, even where they involve a WTO 
member that is not a party to it.  The UNESCO convention can be used, in particular, to 
attempt to constrain WTO jurisprudence so that WTO panels interpret WTO rules in a 
manner that treads lightly in this area, with the result that the application of WTO 
agreements to cultural products will be softened.  Article XX(f) of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994, for example, creates an exception to 
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GATT obligations where a measure is “imposed for the protection of national treasures of 
artistic, historic or archaeological value,” and Article XX(a) does the same for measures 
“to protect public morals.”  The interpretation of these or other GATT provisions could 
be influenced by the UNESCO convention, creating greater uncertainty as to the extent of 
WTO commitments as regards cultural products.  
In sum, in this case as in the case of agricultural biotechnology regulation, the 
potential link between the UNESCO cultural regime and the WTO trade regime, together 
with the stark distributive differences between the US and the EU, have led to a 
“hardening” of bargaining over the UNESCO convention, and could, in time, produce a 
softening of WTO jurisprudence in this area.   
 
3. Even where the US and EU agree on a regulatory approach, smaller states can 
use hard and soft law strategies to attempt to thwart US and EU aims, again choosing 
regimes more favorable to their positions in a fragmented international system.  
However, the US and EU have significant advantages because of their market power and 
resources.  
The US and EU are not the only actors that can engage in strategies of deliberate 
countering of one hard or soft law instrument through activities in a separate regime 
resulting in distinct hard and soft law instruments.  International law can also have 
distributional implications for developing countries, with intellectual property law being 
a prime example.133  In their article on regime complexes, Raustiala and Victor show how 
the US and EU leveraged market power in trade negotiations under the Uruguay Round 
to create new rules under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) which were closely modeled on US or EU law, requiring the 
recognition of intellectual property rights in plant varieties.  Developing countries 
responded by attempting to reframe intellectual property protection in light of 
environmental and development goals under the 1992 Convention on Biodiversity. Their 
                                                 




efforts led to a 2002 Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources (PGR), which partly undercuts 
TRIPS rules.134 
Laurence Helfer has also explored how developing countries “engage in regime 
shifting,” adopting “the tools of soft lawmaking.”135  In doing so, they often work with 
non-governmental groups who serve as allies to help generate counter norms that are 
development-oriented.136  Helfer shows how developing countries have attempted to 
counter the creation of hard intellectual property rights under the TRIPS Agreement and 
bilateral TRIPS-plus agreements through forum-shifting tactics involving the CBD, 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the World Health Organization 
(WHO).  They have attempted to do so regarding an array of issues involving 
biodiversity, plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, public health, and human 
rights.  They aim to generate “new principles, norms and rules of intellectual property” 
within these institutions which “are more closely aligned with these countries’ 
interests.”137  For example, the Conference of the Parties to the CBD has created 
workshops, established working groups and developed guidelines to address the issues of 
indigenous knowledge and the sharing of benefits from the use of genetic resources.138  
Concurrent efforts within the FAO gave rise to the 2002 Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources (PGR) which recognizes “farmers rights,” “sovereign rights” over plant 
genetic resources, and equitable “sharing of the benefits arising from 
commercialization.”139  This treaty constitutes hard law in that it is formally binding, 
although it is much weaker than the TRIPS Agreement in its dispute settlement 
provisions. Once again, countries have engaged in strategic ambiguity in defining the 
PGR Treaty’s relation to the TRIPS Agreement. 
Eyal Benvinisti and George Downs nonetheless question the efficacy of these 
strategies.140  They contend that powerful countries are best able to make use of 
fragmented international regimes through forum-shopping strategies to shape 
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international law over time.  They find that fragmented regime complexes increase the 
transaction costs for participants, favoring those with greater resources.  They argue that 
“creating institutions along narrow functionalist lines … limits the opportunities that 
weaker states have to build cross-issue coalitions that could potentially increase their 
bargaining power and influence.”141  The counter-regimes mentioned by Helfer, for 
example, are soft law regimes compared to the TRIPS Agreement, and weaker states 
have adopted tactics that are primarily reactive in these soft law venues. Benvinisti and 
Downs note, in particular, how “serial bilateralism is being used with increasing 
frequency by powerful states to shape the evolution of norms in areas such as intellectual 
property protection and drug pricing where they have vital interests at stake and where 
their position on issues is far different from those of the vast majority of states.”142  These 
bilateral agreements constitute hard law along all three dimensions defined by Abbot and 
Snidal.  Benvinisti and Downs find a similar process in the negotiation of investment 
protections through bilateral investment treaties.143  The earlier failure of developing 
countries to create a “new international economic order” in the 1970s, including through 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development as a rival institution to the 




Taken together, our hypotheses suggest that hard and soft law may interact in a 
complementary and evolutionary fashion, as predicted in the canonical literature, but only 
under certain conditions.  Specifically, where the US and the EU, as the dominant 
players in global regulation, agree on the aims and terms of regulation, soft and hard law 
may complement each other in the ways discussed by Abbott and Snidal, Shelton, and 
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others, so as to promote greater [regulatory] cooperation.  However, in the absence of 
such an agreement, or in the presence of distributive conflict between the US and the EU 
and third countries, we can predict, and indeed we have seen in several concrete 
instances, that states will strategically use different hard and soft law regimes to advance 
their respective aims in the international arena.  In these cases, hard and soft law regimes 
may be placed in active opposition to each other, with soft law regimes taking on the 
“hard bargaining” characteristics of hard law regimes, while the terms of hard law 
regimes may become increasingly flexible, uncertain and “soft,” insofar as policymakers 
and adjudicators tread softly in deciding cases with implications in neighboring regimes.  
None of our analysis is to suggest that either hard or soft law is inherently flawed 
or not worth pursuing.  Where the scope conditions are right, hard and soft law can 
interact productively, as discussed above.  Furthermore, even where particular issues are 
characterized by distributive conflicts and fragmented international regimes, both hard 
and soft law regimes can play a positive role in encouraging cooperation, provided that 
our expectations of these regimes remain realistic.  Even in these situations, while 
regimes can be expected to lose some of their traditional law advantages — such as 
flexibility and deliberative, technocratic decision-making in soft law regimes and legal 
certainty in hard law regimes — they nevertheless offer useful fora in which states may 
bargain over the adoption of international standards and attempt to address their 
implications.  More generally, multilateral regimes, while subject to distributive conflicts 
and to forum-shopping and inconsistency across regimes, can still provide their 
traditional functions of lowering the transaction costs of negotiations, providing a 
common vocabulary for the parties, clarifying at least some of the mutual understandings 
and obligations of the parties, and contributing to regulatory capacity building in less-
developed countries.145   
In addition, we suggest, tensions and even conflicts among hard and soft 
international law regimes should not necessarily be lamented. The tensions we observe 
simply reflect underlying differences among states and state constituencies, and in 
particular among powerful ones, in a diverse, pluralist world. In such a context, 
overlapping, fragmented regimes can also provide a service to each other, signaling states 
                                                 




and international decision-makers to tread softly in applying their particular rules, taking 
account of developments in other spheres of international law and politics.146  For 
example, they can prompt internal responses within the WTO regime to preserve its own 
political legitimacy.  In the context of agricultural biotechnology regulation, the CBD’s 
Biosafety Protocol has provided a counter-voice which can protect the WTO system from 
the WTO dispute settlement system’s relative insularity from global politics.  These 
agreements, we contend, will interact, and over time, they can operate recursively.  In 
doing so, they can help stabilize conflict and reduce the likelihood of trade wars.  They 
can also facilitate states’ mutual accommodation of regulatory difference at least to a 
greater extent than in the absence of such institutions. 
 Ultimately, we contend, the relationship between international hard law and soft 
law instruments cannot be characterized in a universal or invariant fashion.  Rather, we 
have argued, the interaction of hard and soft law depends in the first instance on the 
broader context of international cooperation, including the respective power of the key 
players, the degree of distributive conflict among them, the constellation and character of 
regimes within a given regime complex, and the distinct politics of implementation.  The 
canonical, complementary and evolutionary relationship between hard and soft law is not 
a myth, we maintain, but that relationship holds only under a set of scope conditions, 
including broad agreement between the US and the EU on the aims and terms of 
international law.  Where these conditions fail to hold, the interaction between hard and 
soft law can be far more adversarial than the canonical literature suggests.  Understanding 
the varied interactions of hard and soft law in a wider set of cases, we believe, represents 
the next major challenge in this field of study.    
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Table 1: Distributive Conflict, Regime Complexes, and  
The Interaction of Hard and Soft Law 
 
 Dist. Conflict Low Dist. Conflict High 
Single, Isolated Regime Complementary interaction 




interaction of hard and soft 
law within the regime, 
although opportunities 
limited by invariant 
memberships, rules, and 
substantive content of 
regime. 
Regime Complex Possible complementary 
interaction of hard and soft 
law, although differing 
memberships, rules and 
substantive foci may render 
coordination difficult even 
in the absence of major 
distributive conflicts.   
Likely antagonistic 
interaction of hard and soft 
law between regimes with 
different decision-making 
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